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AREOSHAHEALTHINSPECTIONS EFFECTIVE?A LONGITUDINAL STUDY IN THE
MA1JFACTURING SECTOR
ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of OSHA healthinspections on compliance with
agency regulations in themanufacturing sector, with a unique plant-level
dataset of inspection and compliance behaviorduring 1972—1983, the first
twelve years of OSHA enforcement operations.Two major findings are robust
across the range of linearand count models estimated in the paper: (1)the
number of citations and the number ofviolations of worker exposure
restrictions decrease with additional healthinspections in manufacturing
plants; and (2) the first health inspectionhas the strongest impact.The
results suggest that prior research focusing onthe limited impact of OSHA
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The Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration has been
controversial since it was established in1970.Observers have challenged
the agency's efforts on worker safety,arguing occupational disease
presents a more serious case for governmentaction2 because workers
experience greater difficulty collectingrisk information for long—term
disease hazards than for more immediateinjury risks.Consequently,
neither the wage—setting process nor theworkers' compensation system
internalize the costs of occupational disease aseffectively as for
occupational injuries.3Given the current regulatory approach to
workplace health and safety, analysts further assertthat OSHA health
standards are more effectively designed toreduce future occupational
disease than OSHA safety standards aredesigned to reduce accidents.
Safety engineers have determined that themajority of injuries are not
related to the violation of OSHA safety standardsand would occur despite
perfect compliance.4On the other hand, OSHA health standardsestablish
2.See Cornell, Noll and Weingast (1976);Hendeloff (1979, 1988); and
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1977).
3.See Boden and Jones (1987), and Barth and Hunt(1980).
4.Strains and over—exertion, for example, cause1/4—1/3ofall lost-time
injuries, but are unaffected by standards.See p.26, Mendeloff
(1979) for a discussion of the studies by safety experts.2
worker exposure restrictions for most of theknown disease threats in the
workplace, and require medical exams, exposure monitoring,and warning
signs.
Rule—making for OSHA health standards has not been exempt from
controversy.Many of the 10 health standards promulgated through rule-
making since 1972 have been challenged on cost-benefitgrounds.5Though
OSHA standard—setting does not explicitly incorporatecost—benefit
principles, the Supreme Court decided in the benzenecase6 and affirmed in
the cotton dust case' that, for each new standard, OSHA mustshow that
"significant risks" currently exist and can be eliminated or reducedwith
the proposed regulation.OSHA also adopted Threshold Limit Values (TLV)
for 400 chemical substances in 1971 and an additional 168chemicals in
1988, by reference from the voluntary standards of the AmericanCommittee
of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a consensus—based
organization.The goals for risk-reduction In ACGIH standard-setting
appear to be less stringent than for OSHAstandards promulgated through
rule—making.
e
5.Mendeloff (1988) compiled and re—evaluated the historical record of
cost and benefit studies for health standards. In his data (Table2.1,
p. 22), the accepted estimatesof the willingness—to-pay for a life
saved ($1.6—$8.3 million in 1985$; Fisher et al., 1989) fall within
the range of costs per cancer prevented for all health standards (with
cancer risks) promulgated through rule—making, exceptvinyl chloride.
Employing an estimate of $2.5 million per life—saved, Mendeloff
concludes that several standards are probably too stringent according
to cost-benefit criteria, though the excess stringency is perhaps not
as great as some critics have suggested. (p. xv)
6.Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607
(1980).
7.American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v Donovan, 452 US 490 (1981).
8.In 1988, OSHA also lowered the TLVs for 234 of the 400 initially
regulated chemicals, in accordance with ACGIH actions on the
substances during the 1971—88 period.See Mendeloff (1988) for a more
complete discussion of the ACGIH standards.3
Despitegreater expectations for OSHA'sintervention to reduce health
risks, lack of suitable data to measurehealth effects has restricted most
statistical studies of OSHA toexamining safetyperformance.9 Though some
early studies suggested OSHAhad no effect on workplace injuries, current
research with longitudinalplant-level data indicates that OSHA has had a
small, salutary effect on reducinginjuries.'0 Because the effect of the
agency on workplacehealth risks has not been evaluated,however, the
research to date may substantiallyunder—represent OSHA's total effect on
workplace quality.
Direct measurement of theincidence of occupational disease is
extremely difficult because of theconfluence of several factors: long
latency periods (frequently10—25 years) between initial workplace
exposure to hazardoussubstances and the onset of disease;mobility of
workers across establishments; and,sometimes, inaccurate diagnoses or
inaccurate attribution of causationfor diseases.As a result, there is
no data seriescomparable to the BLS injury rate seriesfor occupational
diseases with long latency However, current worker exposure
levels represent a useful proxy for thefuture incidence of occupational
9.Exceptions include John Mendeloff's(1988) book focusing on the
process of setting healthstandards, and a study of enforcementof the
asbestos standard (Jones, 1984).
10. Analyzing a 7—year panel withplant-specific injury rates and OSHA
inspection data, Gray and Scholz (1989)estimated that a 10%increase
in inspections with penalties wouldhave a cumulative effect lagged
over 3 years of reducingtotal accident rates by 1—2%.AnalyzingOSHA
enforcement and compliance data, Grayand Jones (1989) showed that
during the first twelve years of the agency,OSHA inspections reduced
citations in ever—inspected plants by3.0 citations or by 0.36 s.d.,
on average. For earlierstatistical studies on safety effects, see
Viscusi (1979, 1986); Bartel and Thomas(1985); Mendeloff (1979);
Smith (1979); and McCaffrey (1983).
11. The BLS data series on workplace diseaseincidence mainly reports skin
problems which manifest shortly after exposure.4
disease because most of the diseases are characterizedby dose—response
relationships.
In this paper, we employ a unique plant-level datasetcharacterizing
OSHA health enforcement and plant compliance, to study the impactof OSHA
on reducing workplace healthhazards.To solve the problem of measuring
OSHA's effect on reducing health risks, we use data that documentthe
worker over—exposures to regulated substances and citations forviolating
OSHA standards, recorded during OSHA health inspections.The longitudinal
structure of the OSHA enforcement data allows us toestimate the
determinants of plant—level health compliance patterns through the first
12 years (1972—1983) of the agency's enforcement operations.We
implicitly assume that the future incidence of occupational disease will
decline with (1) an increase In compliance with OSHA health standards, and
(2) a reduction in violations of worker exposure restrictions.
In recognition of the count form ofthedata series for both
violation measures, we estimate several count—distribution models, along
with the standard linear and log-linear models, to test the robustness of
the results to model specification.Taking advantage of the longitudinal
form of the dataset, we estimate the fixed-effects versions of the Poisson
andnegativebinomial count models developed in Hausman, Hall and
Griliches.
The following section of the paper presents a simple model of
enforcement and compliance.The third section presents the statistical
count models employed in the analysis.The fourth section describes the
data.The fifth section presents the empirical results, and the final
section summarizes the paper.5
II.TUE MODEL
The major actors in themodel of workplace safety andhealth are OSHA
and private companies.OSHA sets standards, inspectsplants, takes
samples measuring workers' exposuresto regulated substances, andissues
citations and penalties whenviolations are detected.Each company is
assumed to choose a level ofcompliance with the standards for eachof its
plants.The compliance level, in turn,has implications for the levels of
worker exposures to hazardoussubstances.
Following the tradition in theplant—level analysis in the OSHA
literature, we employ aspecific—deterrence framework to estimatethe
impact of an inspection of aplant on the subsequent compliancebehavior
of the plant.At any given point in time,the number of previous
inspections signals the intensityof (past) enforcement.The initial
inspections may disseminateinformation to firms about OSHA requirements
and may provide a "managementshock" to action.In addition, we
implicitly assume that firms' responsesto inspections arepartially
motivated by the trade—off betweenthe anticipated future penaltiesfor
non—compliance and the costs ofcompliance.Though OSHA penalties for
initial violations tend to be verylow, the penalty schedules for repeat
and willful violations cited insubsequent inspections aresubstantially
higher.2 To measure the intensity of agency enforcement, weemploy dummy
variables indicating the sequencenumber of the inspection forthe first
through the fifth inspection[SEQNUMJ, j=1,...,51.Wedo not have direct
12. Other—than—serious penaltiesaveraged $88 throughout 1977—84,while
serious penalties averaged$276/citation (1977—80) and$192(1981-84).
However, willful penalties percitation averaged $3361 and$4389, and
repeat penalties per citationaveraged $395 and $365, duringthosetvo
timeperiods, respectively.[Willful and repeat citations canbe
either serious or other—than—serious.]OTA (1985).6
measures of the privatecosts of compliance.We assume that they vary
with the employment sizeISMALLI or are captured in theplant—specific
dummy in the fixed—effectsframework.
We employ two measuresof plant performance with OSIIA health
standards.The number of worker exposure measurementsviolating OSHA
permissible exposure limits LNIJMBADI serves as a proxyfor plant
performance in preventing (reducing)the future incidence of occupational
disease.'3 The number of citations [NUMCITEI provides a measureof
violations of all OSHA standards.
We control for several factorswhich may affect the consistency of
the relationship between measuredand "true" violations across inspections
or through time.First, different Administrations may varyin the rate at
which enforcement officers choose to samplevarious regulated substances,
to cite different types ofviolations, or to impose penalties for repeat
violations.We control for variations in agencyenforcement policy across
Administrations with dummy variables for theNixon/Ford (1972—76) and
Carter (1977—80) Administrations; theexcluded dummy covers 1981—mid-83,
the early part of the Reagan Administration.Second, the origin of each
inspection (complaint, follow—up, general schedule,accident) affects how
much of an establishment is inspected, andtherefore affects the
likelihood that violations will be detected.The dummy variable
13. See the detailed study of the worker exposuredata (Jones et al.,
1986) for a discussion of sampling and reportingissues.An in-depth
study of records in two OSHA offices indicatedthat compliance samples
were taken in 48% and 61% of allhealth inspections, but samples iere
reported in approximately half of the inspectionswith samples taken.
In the study the lack of reporting appeared tobe random.Contrary to
prior hypotheses, the distribution of severitylevels for all
compliance samples taken (as reported in areaoffice files) was
approximately the same as the distribution of severitylevels for all
compliance samples reported in the MIS by area offices.7
identifies general schedule(targeted) inspections, which allow for the
broadest coverage of theworkplace.14
We observe the violationlevel only when an enforcement officer
inspects an establishment.The criteria OSHA uses to selectplants for
repeated inspections will affectthe choice of an appropriate estimation
procedure.OSHA's policy of targetinghigh—hazard plants suggests that
(re)inspectiofl criteria conform tocharacteristics for which we can
control in the analysis.Due to the longitudinal natureof the dataset,
we also employ afixed—effects framework to control forunobservable,
permanent, plant—level effects.
III.STATISTICAL FRA$EWORF FOR COUNTMODELS
The dependent variable NUMCITE,measuring the number ofcitations
detectedinan inspection, equals0 for50% of the sample and has values
of3 or less for 75% of thesample.The other dependent variable
(NUMBADI, measuring the numberof exposure samples in violationof OSHA
standards, equals 0 for 81% of thesample, and has values of 3 orless for
95% of the sample.(See Table AZ for a completecharacterization of the
distributions.)Given these distributions, countmodels, in which the
dependent variable takes onlynon—negative integer values, seem more
appropriate than the standard continuousapproximations.Of particular
interest are the fixed—effectsversions of the Poisson andnegative
binomial models developed in Hausman,Hall and Griliches (1984)(hereafter
referred to as HHG).The presentation below of themodels we estimate is
based on their discussion.
14. In accident, follow—up, andcomplaint inspections, inspectors are
directed to focus on the specific factorsoriginating the inspection.8
For events that occur randomly andindependently through time, the
Poisson distribution is a natural startingpoint among count models.
Denote the Poisson parameter asX, and the number of violations identified
by OSRA for plant jduringinspection i, as v,.The basic Poisson
probability distribution is:
(1) pr(v) =f(v)[exp(-X]XiIvj!i=l,...I;j=l,...J.
The exponential functional form is conventionallyused to incorporate
exogenous variables, X, in order torestrict the range of possible
values of the predicted Poisson parameter to positivereal numbers:'5
(2) =exp(X16)
HHG note that the advantages of the Poissonframework include (1)
natural treatments of the integer property of the outcomesand of the
zero—value case; (2) convenient time aggregation, whichfacilitates the
implementation of a fixed—effect framework; and (3) ease ofestimation by
MLE due to global concavity of log—likelihood function.
At the same time, the basic Poisson model isrestrictivein several
ways.First, it is based on the assumption that events areindependently
and identically distributed through time conditional on X.Given the
panel structure of the data, a primary alternative hypothesis is
heterogeneity across plants, attributable to unmeasured differencessuch
15. Use of the exponential form requires adding 1to the values of the
dependent variable, to handle 0—value observations.9
as planttechnology, compliance costs, andmanagementattitudes,'6 which
we test with thefixed—effects Poisson framework.
Second, the Poisson is asingle_parameter distribution in whichthe
mean and varianceof (v,IX) are equal.If this equality restriction is
inappropriately imposed, the estimatedstandard errors of 0maybe
spuriously small.Greater flexibility in themean/variance relationship
can be achieved bygeneralizing the Poisson model(which is deterministic
in XIXO)toallow for unexplained variationin X. Under certain
distributional assumptions, theresulting compound Poisson distribution
yields the negative binomialdistribution.
Figure 1 summarizes the models weestimate.For comparison with the
count models, we alsoestimate 2 linear models.The first model is:
(v.X+c), or (v=X#u+C) in thefixed—effects version.The first and
second moments are:(X0,i,2) and (X0iiJ, a,2+a2) respectively.The
second model is the log—linearversion, lnvX6+C, or lnv=XBi-I.I+Cin the
fixed—effects form, with first andsecond moments(exp(X0J,a2) and
(expLXOi.uI,a22+a,.2), respectively.The third and fourth models arethe
Poisson and negative binomialmodels, respectively.The assumed mean
function is the same in models 2-4,exp(X0), which differs from the mean
function in model 1: (X0).
16. Alternative violations of theindependence hypothesis includethe
"true contagion" model, in whichthe occurrence of an event may
increase the probability of subsequentoccurrences, and the"spells"
model, in which events occur in clusters,where clusters occur
according to one probability law, andthe events within a given
cluster occur according to a differentprobability law.Given the
long time between health inspections,it seems highly unlikelythat
either of these effects occur in thedata.We estimated first-order
serial correlations of error terms forthe basic Poisson modeland


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The basic Poisson model(3.1 in Figure 1) yields thefollowing log-
likelihood function for a samplecovering i inspections in plant j across
j plants:
(3) log I.=EE(v!—exp(X)+v.,(Xj5)I
The OSBA panel is unbalanced:plants vary in the total numberof health
inspections they have received.In the analysis sample, we truncatethe
number of inspections inplant j, i, to a maximum of 5.
Unobserved plant—specific effects canbe incorporated by specifying
— Because X needs to bepositive, the following form is
employed:
(4) = = exp(X+ +
whereIJjis the effect specific to plant jand u0isthe overall
intercept.The fixed—effects framework does notrequire a distributional
assumption for ,andallows for correlation betweenthe plant effect and
the observed exogenousvariables.1'
HHG observe that thefixed-effects specification cannotbe
implemented simply by estimating separate parameters because, with I
held fixed and J large, theincidental parameter problem occursvhich may
lead to inconsistency in MLestimators.' Instead they employ the
17. This flexibility represents amajor advantage relative tothe random-
effects framework, an alternativepanel data model.However,
inferences with the fixed—effectsmodel are conditional onthe plant
error term; unconditionalinferences are not possiblewithout more
specific distributional assumptions.
18. See Neymann and Scott (1948);Andersen (1973); and Haberiflan(1977).12
conditional Maximum Likelihood techniques ofAndersen (1970, 1972), and
condition on by conditioning on the sum of violations forplant j
acrossits inspections, E1V.
Thelog—likelihood function for the fixed—effect Poisson model (3.2)
is:
(5) log L =E)(1ogr[(Ev1))+1J—Elogr(v)+-1)
—
where sc I
The log—likelihood function consists of different segmentsfor plants
with 2,3,4 or 5 inspections in the panel, respectively,with the
segments linked by common parameters on sharedvariables.t9
Negative Binomial Distribution Models
To relax the Poisson model restriction that the meanand variance of
(v1IX) are equal, we allow for randomness in X byreplacing (2) with
the stochastic equation:
(6) —exp[X6+
wherethe error term s represents intrinsic randomness.It is well known
that if the probability density of c, or equivalently of follows
the gamma distribution, then the pr(v1)) is distributed negativebinomial.
HHG assume gamma—distribution parameters (y,8),with
and 8 common both across firms and across time.Note the nature of the
19. In order to implement the fixed—effects framework, plants with only
one inspection cannot be used in the analysis.13
stochasticity in in this model: can vary over time evenif
remains constant (unlike with the Poissonmodel); however, there are no
firm—specific effects, so the are independent acrossinspections for a
plant.With this formulation, the first and second momentsof the
distribution of v are: and
With a variance/mean ratio for v of(1+6)18 > 1,the specification allows
for over—dispersion (with theoriginal Poisson as a limiting case with
6-).However, it does not allow the variance toincrease with the value
of the dependent variable.
The log—likelihood function for model4.1 is:
(7) log L =£1(—logr(v÷1)—1ogr(exp(Xø)]
+exp(XB)log(8/(l+8)I
—(v)log(l+8)+logr(v1+exp(X1,B)1}
In order to incorporate plant—specificeffects in the negative
binomial model, HUG again condition theestimation on the sum of citations
across all inspections.Th firm—specific effect isincorporated by
setting the parameters of the underlying gammafunction as follows:
('rj,8j) =(expIX8Jf/exp[3iJ) where 8 now varies across plants-




The variance/mean ratio for vin this specification is (exp(u)J +
whichallows for both over—dispersion and a plant—specificvariance/mean
ratio.The log—likelihood function for the fixed—effectsnegative
binomial model (4.2)is:
(8) log L =E(logr[(Ev)+1J—E1logr(v+1)
+logrIEexp(X1J)1—
+E1logr(exp(X6)+v1—ElogrIexp(X)])
As with the fixed—effects Poisson model, thelog—likelihood function
consists of four separate segments with plants in each segment
distinguished by total number of health inspections, 1,=2,...5, but
sharing the same coefficient matrix 8.
IV.DATA
The source of data for the analysis is OSHA's enforcement Management
Information System (MIS), used by the agency to track agency enforcement
and company compliance performance.The version of the MIS data obtained
for this study includes the 63,383 federal health inspections performedin
20
37,639manufacturing establishments between 1972 and the middle of 1983.
In order to create longitudinal records of plant inspection histories,
Gray (1986) matched all inspections of individual establishments using
20. Not included in the data are those few inspections done in 1971 and
1972 before the MIS was operational, and inspections performed in
"state plan" states, where state authorities have taken over
responsibility for enforcement.15
establishment—level identifiers.2' In order toimplement efficiently the
conditioning procedure in the Andersen ML.Etechnique, we only include up
to the fifth inspection for aplant.This truncation does not result in
the loss of any plants, but doeseliminate 2909 health inspections of
sequence order 6 and above(4.6% of all inspections) in 984 heavily
health—inspected plants (2.6% of all plants), yielding asample of 60,474
inspections.
In order to estimate the fixed—effectversions of the models, we
restrict the analysis sample to the35,427 health inspections in the
12,592 plants with two or more healthinspections during the period.
Table Al compares the means and standarddeviations of the variables for
the full sample (I) with for the analysissample (II).Across the full
sample, inspectors wrote citations (NUNCITE)in 50% of the inspections,
averaging 2.5 citations across all inspectionsand 5 citations in
inspections with citations.Inspectors reported an average of .6 exposure
samples violating exposure limits in eachinspection, for an average of
3.2 violations in plants with exposureviolations.In the analysis
sample, the NUMCITE mean is almost identical;the mean of NUMBAD is 25%
higher than the mean for sample I (.76 relative to.61).
In its early years, OSHA did not hire manyindustrial hygienists and
so the agency conductedrelatively few health inspections.The agency
began to place greater priority on healthinspections by the end of the
21.Thisproject used the Fellegi-Sunter technique ofrecord matching,
based on establishing the likelihood of agreementin the various
fields.Because of the variation in coding ofestablishment data over
time (including errors in data entry), there arealmost certainly
cases in which inspections of the sameestablishment are not
identified as such.It is also possible (though lesslikely given the
structure of the weights) that inspectionsof different establishments
are mis—identified as repeatinspections of a single establishment.16
Ford Administration, when ahealth professional was appointed headof the
agency for thefirst time.In the full sample, healthinspections are
fairly evenly distributed acrossthe years in the Carter (1977—80) and
Reagan (1980—mid—83)Administrations (at 11% per year, with aslight bulge
to 12.6% In 1980).Not surprisingly, after eliminatingplants with only
one inspection,the profile of sample II shiftsslightly toward the
earlier part of the panel.General-schedule targeting (aimed toward high-
hazard workplaces) generated 44%of the inspections among all plants,
dropping to 1/3 in the analysissample.Slightly over half of the
inspections (55%) in sample I were Inplants with fewer than 100
employees; the share of small plantsdeclines to 42% in the analysis
sample.
Table A2 presents more detaileddescriptive statistics for the two
count variables, separately forthe two samples.Given the patterns In
the means, it Is not surprising that thedistribution for NUMCITE Is
almost identical for the two samples andthe distribution for NUMBAD is
shifted slightly upward in the analysis sample.We also show a 2x2 table
indicating the joint outcomes on the 2 violation measures.It is
reassuring that among plants with exposureviolations, 88% received
citations.Among plants with citations, 34% haddocumented exposure
violations.
22
22.Inspectors may cite plants for not havingthe appropriate control
equipment to achieve exposure limits, withouttaking exposure
measurements.Alternatively, citations may involveviolations of
other requirements such as exposure employermonitoring, warning
signs, personal protective equipment, ormedical exams.17
V. E1PIRICALRESULTS
Themajor issue considered in this paper is: do OSHA'senforcement
efforts deter violations of OSHA healthstandards?To address this issue
we estimate each of thefour models developed above, both with and without
plant—specific fixed effects.For the versions of the model withoutfixed
effects, we control for the selectioneffect by incorporating the variable
HNUMINSP, the total number of healthinspections experienced by a plant,
as a proxy for the plantfixed effect.As with the inspection—sequence
series of variables [HSEQNUMI, we createdummy variables for values of
HNUMINSP equal to 1 through523
Tables 1 and 2 report the estimates of thedeterminants of the total
number of citations, NUMCITE, and thenumber of exposure violations
reported, NUMBAD, respectively.Across all specifications for both
variables, the results are consistent with thequalitative conclusions
that (1) both measures of violation (worker exposureviolations and
citations of standards) decrease withadditional inspections, and (2) the
first health inspection has the strongestimpact in reducing violations.
We first consider the results for NUMCITEpresented in Table 1.In
all four models, the fixed-effects framework cannotbe rejected.The
coefficients on the health inspection variables(IISEQNUMJ) are somewhat
larger (and the differences are statisticallysignificant) in the fixed—
effects versions.However, the estimates of the impactof OSHA
enforcement throughout the sample, (summarizedfor fixed—effects models
below in Table 3), are not greatly affected bythe differences.
23. With this model, the coefficients of thehealth inspection sequence
variablesEHSEQNUMh the focus of our inquiry, areestimated without
bias.The coefficients on HNUMINSP are underestimatedby a factor
equal to the ratio of the variance of the"noise" in HNUMINSP (as a











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Because the specification of the mean function is a critical
component in the implementation of the count models, we are particularly
interested in specification testing for models 1 and 2.The R2 are not
comparable in the two models (due to the data transformation).
Alternatively, we use the Sargan test which indicates the log—linear model
(2) is preferred to the linear version(1).24
Comparing the results for the two count—distribution models, we see
the dramatic decline in the log—likelihood function for the negative
binomial model25 relative to the Poisson, from —126,186 to —66,464 for the
non—fixed—effects version, and -53,989 to —23,375 for the fixed—effects
version.Based on a test, the negative binomial model is not rejected
in either version.For the non—fixed—effects version, we can also examine
the estimate of 6, which allows for over—dispersion in the negative
binomial specification.In model 4.1, the estimated ratio of the variance
to the mean is (1+6)16=6, substantially different fromthe imposed ratio
24. The statistic presented by Sargan (1964) is:S=(j/g2)T, where b is
the root—Inse from model 1, and is the root-mse from model 2, and g
is the geometric mean of v.Based on the assumption that the errors
from each model k, (k1,2), are distributed iid N(O,k): if S>1, then
model 2 is favored; if S<1, then model 1 is favored.[Maddala (1977,
p. 317) proposed acomparable test.jThe value of (/g2) =2.8for
both the fixed-effects and the non—fixed—effects versions, which
indicates that the log—linear model is preferred to the linearmodel.
25. Unlike the other fixed—effects models, the negativebinomial allows
estimation of coefficients for variables that are constant for aplant
over time.Including the constant term had important implications:
without it, the IISEQNUM2 coefficient in the NIJMBAD equation was
substantially (50Z) higher in magnitude, yielding a much larger
estimate of the effect of first inspections than with theother
models.We also include the SMALL plant dummy in the reported
results.The procedure would not converge when the HNUMINSP dummies
wereincluded, however, due to their high collinearity with the
HSEQNUM dummies.When we incorporated UNUMINSP dummies with a range
of pre—specified parameter values for the coefficients(rather than
estimating them), the }ISEQNUM parameter estimates were notgreatly
affected.22
of 1 in the Poissonmodel.Note also that the standard errorsare larger
in the negativebinomial model, consistentwith the observation above that
the standard errorsestimated in the Poisson models maybe spuriously
small whereover—dispersion occurs due to theimposed equality of mean and
variance.
The HSEQNUM coefficientsin the linear model (1,v=X6+c) indicate
the change in theviolation level with additionalinspections.For the
three other models (2-4)based on the log—linear formof the relationship,
(lnvX&.C), the coefficientsindicate the percentage changein the
dependent variable with anadditional inspection.In order to compare
across models theestimated effect of inspections onthe level of
violations, we multiply thecoefficients in models 2-4 bythe mean of the
dependent variables (v), whichgives us the estimatedinspection effect at
the sample mean.In the following discussion we assumethat the reduction
in citations induced by aninspection is permanent, whichyields a
conservative interpretation of theincremental effects of repeated
inspections.26
The first four columns o Table3 summarize the impactof sequential
inspections on citations.Due to the statisticaldominance of the fixed—
effects models, we report only thoseestimates of the inspectioneffects,
in both numerical counts andstandardized units (+sd).Before turning to
Table 3, we observe in Table 1 thatthe coefficients on thehealth
26. Alternatively, if the impact isshort—lived, the effect of inspection
j—l equals the sum of thejcoefficientplus all earlier HSEQNUM
coefficients.A longer—term effect seems moreappropriate when
compliance predominantly involves makingcapital investments with long
time horizons; the short-term effect seemsmore appropriatewhen
compliance primarily requires the paymentof operating expenses.
Conventional wisdom suggests safetycompliance is more orientedtoward
operating expenditures and health tocapital expenditures.23
sequence variables are all precisely estimated, with the exception of the
HSEQNUMS variables.
For NUMCITE [mean=2.5, sd=5.2J, the pattern of inspection effects is
very similar for models 1,2, and 3.The log—linear results (Col. 2.2)
indicate that the first—inspection effect is to reduce citations by —2.0,
with subsequent inspections yielding reductions of -.5,—.4,and —.14
citations each, for an estimated total impact of the OSHA inspection
pattern for the average manufacturing plant of -2.4 (-.5 Sd).For the
Poisson model, the estimated total effect is approximately the same, -2.7
citations (—.5 Sd); with reductions declining across inspections, -1.9,
—1.0, —.4, —.2.The negative binomial model estimates OSHA's total effect
to be 20% lower than the other three models: —1.9 citations (-.2), with
the reductions concentrated on the first inspection (—1.8 citations), with
subsequent inspections yielding reductions of —.15, —.15, —.01 citations.
Note the effect of an inspection is observed in the subsequent
inspection.The estimates of total effects cited above assume that the
(unobserved) effect of the last inspection for each plant is equal to the
effect measured for that inspection sequence number in the sub-set of the
sample receiving additional inspections.27Alternatively, "more
conservative" estimates of the effect of OSHA inspections during 1972—83,
based on the assumption that there is no effect of the last inspection in
any plant, range from —1.2 (—.2 Sd) to —1.6 (—.3 sd) for the Poisson
model.(See the notes to Table 3 for further details on the calculations.)
27. It follows that we have no measure of the effect of the fifth
inspection, and so we must assume a zero impact.The calculation
attributes the estimated first—inspection effect to plants receiving
only one inspection; these plants were not included in the analysis
sample.24
The results for the numberof violations of worker exposurelimits
(NUMBADI reported in Tables2 and 3 follow similar patterns.In the
fixed—effects versions (which are notrejected for any of the models), the
coefficients tend to be slightlylarger.The Sargan test, comparing the
linear and log—linear forms,again indicates that thelog—linear model is
preferred.2 Between the two count models,the negative binomial model is
strongly preferred according tothe X2 test.With NUMBAD, the estimated
over—dispersion in the variance/meanratio in model 4.1 is smaller:
(1+8)/5.3.The parameter estimates forthe HSEQNUM variables are
significant except for theHSEQNUM5 variable (for all models)and for
HSEQNUM4 with the negativebinomial model.
The estimates of the total effectof OSHA health inspections on
over—exposures [mean.75, sd2.51 aresummarized in the last four columns
of Table 3 for the fixed—effectsversion of the models. All four models
again produce similar estimates ofthe total impact of OSHA: -.4
overexposures for the log-linearand negative binomial models,and -.5
overexposures for the linearand Poisson models.In the log-linear model,
the inspection effects are —.3, —.1,—.1, and —.06, for a weighted average
of —.4 over—exposures, (—.2 sd) or,according to the more conservative
calculation, —.2 over—exposures (—.1 sd).In the negative binomial model
(4.2), the estimates of individualinspection—effects are —.4, —.04, -.03,
and —.02, for a total impact of —.4 citations(—.2 sd) or, more
conservatively, —.3 citations (—.1 Sd).Though all models indicate large
first—inspection reductions with smaller effectsfrom subsequent
28. The value of (1/g2) was 3.4 for thefixed—effects model and 3.3 for
the non—fixed—effects model.25
inspections, it is notable how much more pronounced the effect is with the
negative binomial model.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONOF RESULTS
Inthis paper, we provide the first estimates of the impact of OSHA
health—related enforcement on compliance throughout the manufacturing sector.
We resolved the lack—of-data impediment to research on OSHA's health effects
by creating violation measures from the data on exposure samples and citations
recorded by OSHA inspectors in the agency enforcement MIS.
Two major conclusions are robust across the range of linear and count
models estimated in the paper: (1) both the number of citations of OSHA
standards and the number of violations of worker exposure limits decrease with
additional health inspections in manufacturing plants; and (2) the first
health inspection has the strongest impact.The best estimates, based on the
fixed—effects negative binomial models, suggest that in ever-inspected
manufacturing plants, OSHA health inspections during the first twelve years of
the agency operation have reduced the number of citations on average by -2 or
-.4 sd and have reduced the number of detected exposure violations by -.4or
—.23 sd.29The ranges of estimates across the models are for reductions from
—1.9 to —2.7 citations and for reductions of —.4 to —.5 worker over-
exposures samples.The methodology does not allow us to estimate the
29. The estimated reduction in citations induced by health inspections
presented In this paper is of comparable magnitude to the estimated
reduction reported in our earlier study, focusing on safety inspections
(80Z of all OSHA inspections).With a Tobit model, we estimated
inspection effects on citations of (-2.3, —.6, —.5 and -.3); with a linear
fixed—effectsmodel, the estimated inspection effects were somewhat larger
(—2.9, —1.4, —.8, and —.9).The average effect of OSHA inspections
throughout the 12—year panel period (based on the Tobit coefficients), ias
toreduce citations by —3 or —.36 sd.
Because the dataset involved in the safety analysis was substantially
larger, we did not employ the difficult-to—estimate count models.26
indirect or generaldeterrent effects ofinspections on other non—inspected
plants, for examplein the same industry orthe same geographical area.
Also the analysisis strictly limited tofederal OSHA inspections: it does
not necessarily measurethe impact of enforcementefforts in states with
federally_approved state enforcement programs.
We assume that thefuture incidence ofoccupational disease will tend
to declinewith an increase in compliancewith OSHA standards and a
reduction in violations ofworker exposure restrictions.Based on this
assumption, the resultsdemonstrating OSHA's efficacy inpromoting
compliance with healthstandards suggest that OSHA ismaking a valuable
contribution to the reductionof workplace risks.By focusing on the
limited impact of safetyregulations, prior evaluationsof OSHA may have
substantially under—estimated OSHA' sworkplace impact.
To make recommendationsfor future enforcement policywould require
extrapolations beyond the plantsever—observed in the sample.Nonetheless,
one particularly robustresult observed in both ourprevious safety
inspection study and the currenthealth inspection study deservescomment.
Within the 12—year panel period,the large reduction incitations and
exposure violations followingthe first inspection of aplant contrasts
greatly with the small measured effectof later inspections.The results
suggest that, on the margin,substantial gains could occur ifinspection
resources were reallocatedfrom the intensive margin tothe extensive
margin of OSHA's inspection strategy.27
TABLE Al.Descriptive statistics for the analysis sample
Sample I—HealthInspections (1 —5),N —60,474.
Sample II Health inspections (1.—5)in plants receiving at least
2 health inspections, N 35,427.
I II
Mean Mean
Name Description (s.d) (s.d)
NIJMCITE Number of citations In this 2.518 2.545
inspection (4.954) (5.214)
NUMBAD Number of worker exposure samples .614 .759
violating exposure restrictions. (2.233) (2.551)
HSEQNUM Health sequence number of this Inspection
of this establishment (Dummy variables).
USEONUM1 =1 if [Sequence number ￿1J 1.000 1.000
HSEQNIJH2 >2] .378 .645
HSEONUM3 >3] .169 .289
HSEQNUM4 4J .076 .130
HSEQNUM5 ￿51 .028 .047
HNUHINSP Number of total health Inspections of
this establishment (Dummy variables).
HNUMINS?1=1 if [Total inspections 1J .413 0
HNUMINSP2 =2] .231 .393
HNUHINSP3 31 .133 .226
HNUMINSP4 4] .085 .145
HNUHINSP5 ￿51 .138 .236
GENERAL =1 if origin of inspection was a .437 .335
general schedule (targeted) inspection
0 if origin was complaint, accident .563 .665
or follow—up
FORD =1 if inspection occurred in 72—76 .261 .282
O otherwise
CARTER =1 if inspection occurred in 77-80 .456 .51
0otherwise
REAGAN =1 if inspection occurred in 81—mid83 .283 .199
0othervise
SMALL =1 if Number of employees< 100 .549 .42()
0if Number of employees> 100 .451 .58028
TABLEA2.Detailed descriptive statistics forthe violation variables.
NUNCITE NUMBAD
*
Sample I II I II
Mean 2.518 2.545 .614 .759
Std. dev. (4.954) (5.214) (2.232) (2.551)
N 60,474 35,427 60,474 35,427
Frequency counts:
cumX cumZ cumZ cumZ
0 49.8 51.4 80.9 77.2
1 62.0 63.2 88.5 85.9
2 71.2 72.0 92.6 90.9
3 77.8 78.1 94.9 93.7
4 82.3 82.2 96.4 95.6
5 85.7 85.5 97.4 96.7
6 88.4 88.1 98.0 97.5
7 90.4 90.1 98.5 98.1
8 92.1 91.7 98.8 98.5
9 93.4 93.1. 99.0 98.8
10 94.4 94.1 99.2 99.0
Highest extremes: 88 85 64 64
88 88 67 67
99 99 71 71
115 115 75 75
123 123 88 88
*
Sampledefinitions: Irefers to health inspections 1-5 forall plants
IIrefers to health inspections 1—5for all plants
with 2 or more health inspectionsNUMBAD
=0
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